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767. After this rule, the conduct of the insurer need no longer be opprobrious or unconscionable in nature, but only intentional
with an underlying improper purpose of
inducing a client to settle directly with the
insurer.
The court reversed the court of special
appeals but admitted that it did so only because Sharrow barely alleged a claim for
tortious interference with contract. Sharrow, on the basis of the broader rule, although lacking specificity, alleged the elements necessary to sustain: the tort claim.
Based on the facts and the court's analysis,
it is highly unlikely that Sharrow had what
was needed to prove the commission of
tortious interference with contract. The
court, however, supplied practitioners,
who may find themselves victims of an interference with contract, with the ammunition necessary to actually prove the tort.
The court emphasized that the determinative factor in such cases is whether
there was purposeful conduct by the insurer, or whether such conduct was by the
client. If the facts of Sharrow's case showed
that State Farm rather than Zorbach actually initiated the settlement negotiations,
the purposeful conduct of State Farm would
indeed be more substantial and the tort
claim more likely to succeed at trial. Also
absent from Sharrow's complaint was an
allegation that State Farm's purpose in negotiating directly with Zorbach was for its
own benefit. The presence of such an allegation would enhance the success of a claim
alleging the commission of the tort and
certainly assist in proving the same.
The Sharrow case sends a message to insurance companies to tread lightly whenever they may be in a position of dealing
with a claimant directly. The insurer's
duty toward its insured, heretofore rather
ambiguous, does not extend to intentional
conduct, however subtle, whereby the insurer leads a claimant to discharge his attorney and settle his claim.

-Kevin S. Anderson

Knill v. Knill: HUSBAND MAY NOT
BE EQUITABLY ESTOPPED
TO DENY CHILD SUPPORT
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
may not be applied to estop a husband
from denying support to an illegitimate
child born to his wife by another man during the marriage, unless the husband's
voluntary conduct in treating the child as
his own gives rise to reliance by the child
upon such conduct and such conduct results in the child suffering financial loss.
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Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 510 A.2d 546
(1986).
Charles and Cledythe Knill had been
married ten years. As a result of their marriage, two children were born. After the
birth of their children, Charles underwent
surgery for a full vasectomy. However, one
and a half years after the operation, Mrs.
Knill bore a third child, Stephen. Both
parties acknowledged that Stephen was
not Charles' son. According to Cledythe,
the natural father was a former co-worker.
Charles apparently forgave Cledythe for
her infidelity and the marriage continued
for twelve years with Stephen being reared
and supported as a member of the Knill
family. During this twelve year period,
Stephen had no knowledge of his illegitimacy. Charles was named as Stephen's father on his birth certificate. Additionally,
Stephen was treated as "one of the family"
and was thereby so known in the community where the family resided. In the aftermath of a family dispute, Cledythe revealed
to Stephen that Charles was not his natural father. Charles nevertheless continued to support Stephen for two years
until Cledythe sued for divorce. Among
her prayers for relief, Cledythe requested
child ·support for Stephen. The Circuit
Court for Frederick County held,that even
though Charles was not Stephen's natural
father, he was estopped from asserting the
illegitimacy of the child in order to avoid
child support.
On appeal, Charles argued that since he
was not Stephen's natural father he could
not be ordered to support Stephen. Maryland law places the responsibility of child
support squarely on the shoulders of natural parents. MD. FAM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 15-703(b)(l) (1984). See also,
Bledsoe v. Bledsoe, 794 Md. 183,448 A.2d
353 (1982). Charles asserted that he stood
in loco parentis during the twelve years that
he voluntarily supported him. Since this
relationship had been temporary in nature,
he owed no legal duty to continue to support Stephen. On the other hand, Cledythe
contended that the doctrine of equitable
estoppel should be applied to prevent an
inequitable and unconscionable result.
For the first time in Maryland, the court
of appeals had the opportunity to address
the applicability of equitable estoppel to a
child support proceeding. For the doctrine's to apply that a party claiming the
benefit of estoppel must have been misled
to his injury and changed his position for
the worse, having believed and relied on
the representations of the party sought to
be estopped. Dahl v. Brunswick Corp., 277
Md. 471, 356 A.2d 221 (1976). See also,
3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 804
(5th Ed. 1941).

In Knill, by a 4-3 decision, the court held
that a husband cannot be equitably estopped
to deny a duty to support. In reaching its
decision Judge Cole for .the majority reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions
which had previously addressed the issue.
While a few jurisdictions had held that
equitable estoppel is to be applied in order
to force child support, as in Clevenger v.
Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 707 (1961) and the Supreme Court
of New Jersey in Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J.
154,478 A.2d 351 (1984), the majority for
the court followed the holdings of the majority of jurisdictions which do not apply
the doctrine to estop a husband from denying paternity and a support obligation. See
e.g., Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn.
114, 479 A.2d 833 (1980); Weise v. Weise,
699 P.2d 700 (Utah 1985).
The court in Knill stated that in order
for the doctrine ofequitable estoppel to apply, the related elements of representation,
reliance and detriment must be present.
The Court indicated that the application
of the three-element test requires that the
voluntary conduct or representation of the
party to be estopped must give rise to
the estopped party's reliance and, in turn,
result in detriment to the estopped party.
In applying the elements of equitable estoppel to the facts in Knill, the court found
the elements of representation and reliance to be present. The facts showed that
Charles represented to Stephen that he
was his father and these representations
were accepted and acted upon by the child.
[d. at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The facts also
showed Stephen relied upon the representations and treated Charles as his father,
giving his love and affection to him in ignorance of the true facts. [d. In regard to
the element of detriment, the court stated,
[T]he evidence in this case~ however
fails to demonstrate any finimcial detriment incurred by Stephen as a result
of Charles's course of conduct during
their twelve year relationship ... if any
detriment was incurred by Stephen, it
was emotional and attributable to his
mother ... it was she who ripped the
'cloak of legitimacy' off the boy when
she revealed to him that Charles was
not his father.

Knill, at 537, 510 A.2d at 551. The court
concluded that since the elements of equitable estoppel were not satisfied, Charles
could not be held legally responsible for
child support.
For the dissent, Chief Judge Murphy,
opined, "I think the majority is dead
wrong." Id. at 539, 510 A.2d at 552. Murphy

agreed that the natural father should be
considered the primary source for child
support and recognized that caution must
be exercised when imposing child support
liability on a non-biological father. In addition the dissent, like the majority, believed that an estoppel may arise even
when there is no intent to mislead, if the
actions of one party cause a prejudicial
change in the welfare of another. However, the dissent disagreed with the majority's reasoning that financial detriment
is the only type of detriment, such being
the sole reason the majority denied the application of equitable estoppel. Id. at 541,
510 A.2d at 556.
The dissent concluded that emotional
detriment should be sufficient to establish
the element of detriment, and the facts in
Knill supported a finding of emotional
detriment. /d. at 547, 510 A.2d at 559. In
light of the circumstances in Knill, the dissent observed the duration of the husband's
representations to determine whether a true
paternal relationship developed between
Charles and Stephen. Moreover, the frustration of the realistic opportunity to discover and establish a relationship with the
natural father was considered. Finally, the
dissent noted the devastating effect on a
child's welfare where a long established
paternal relationship has been breached
resulting in the child being proclaimed a
bastard and left without a father. The dissent ultimately determined that detriment
was in fact established, and therefore
Charles should have been precluded from
disavowing parental responsibility for
child support. Id. at 554, 510 A.2d at 560.
In Knill, the court stated that since statute of limitations no longer exist in paternity suits Cledythe could maintain a successful paternity action against Stephen's
natural father. Furthermore, even though
Charles knew Stephen was not his son, the
conduct which he demonstrated was consistent with Maryland's public policy of
strengthening the family unit. Maryland
encourages such conduct so long as it does
not interfere or deprive the child or mother
of the right or opportunity to seek legal
support from the natural father.
In Maryland, as in the majority of other
jurisdictions that have addressed this issue,
a husband may not be equitably estopped
from denying child support to an illegitimate child. In Knill, a case of first impression, the dissent would have considered
whether the paternal relationship did, in
fact, exist. The end result in Knill is that
Charles Knill, who voluntarily assumed
the role as a father, has no legal duty to
support Stephen. But in the final analysis
Stephen will suffer the "ultimate humiliation of having no support from a man who

for all purposes was his father for fourteen
years." Brieffor Appellee at 6.
- William James Momson, III

United States, Petitioner fJ. American
Bar Endowment et al.: SUPREME
COURT FINDS CHARITABLE
ORGANIZATION'S INSURANCE
PROGRAM TAXABLE
The Supreme Court recently upheld a
tax assessment by the IRS against the
American Bar Endowment (ABE) concerning income received from an insurance
plan made available to its members. In
United States, Petitioner v. American Bar
Endowment et al., 106 S.Ct. 2426 (1986),
the Court decided two issues related to the
particular plan. First, whether income derived from the insurance plan constituted
"unrelated business income" subject to tax
under §§511 through 513 of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code), 26 U.S.C. §§511513, and second, whether the members
who participated in the plan could claim a
charitable deduction for those premium
payments which amounted to dividends
on behalf of the ABE.
The ABE is a corporation exempt from
taxation because it is "organized and operated exclusively for charitable ... or educational purposes." 26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3).
In order to fund its charitable work, the
ABE provides group insurance policies to
its members. By purchasing insurance as a
group, the ABE has bargaining power that
an individual would lack. Furthermore,
the cost of the insurance to the group is less
because it is based on the group's claims
experiences instead of general actuarial
tables. Normally, the cost of this plan to
the insurance company is less than the
premiums paid by the ABE, thereby entitling the ABE to a "dividend." Instead of
dispersing the amount of the dividend
among the participating members, the
ABE retains the whole dividend amount to
aid its fund-raising efforts. Members are
required to agree to this arrangement as a
condition to participation in the insurance
plan. They have also been advised by the
ABE that relinquishment of the dividend
constitutes a tax-deductible contribution
to the ABE, thereby making the after-tax
cost of the insurance, "less than the cost of
a commercial policy with identical coverage
and premium rates." 106 S.Ct. at 2429.
The ABE was assessed a tax deficiency
after an audit by the IRS in 1980. Its insurance plan was considered an "unrelated
trade or business" such that any profits
realized were subject to tax. 26 U.S.C.
§§51l-513. The ABE paid the taxes as-

sessed, and then brought an action in the
Claims Court for a refund after all administrative remedies had been exhausted. Individual participants who had not yet
taken a deduction for the excess premiums
paid brought an action for refunds as well.
The two suits were consolidated for trial in
the Claims Court.
The Claims Court found in favor of the
ABE in its suit, holding that its insurance
plan did not constitute a "trade or business" for purposes of the tax. The court's
conclusion was based on the following four
factors:
(1) The program was developed as a
means of raising funds for the
ABE's educational efforts.
(2) The program's success in generating dividends evidenced noncommerical behavior.
(3) Together, participants could change
the program to reduce premiums.
(4) The ABE was not in competition
with other non-charitable companies because it did not underwrite or act as a broker.
In the individual respondent's action, the
court held that they had failed to show that
the insurance was purchased at a greater
price ''with the intention that the excess be
used to benefit a charitable enterprise,"
and were thus denied a charitable deduction. 4 Cl.Ct. 415 (1984). On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
affirmed the decision of the Claims Court
as to the ABE, but reversed and remanded
the decision as to the individual respondents for further fact-finding. The Supreme Court granted the Government's
petition for certiorari on both issues.
I. In a six to one decision, the Court held
that the insurance program offered by the
ABE constituted a trade or business for
purposes of the unrelated trade or business
tax. By definition, the Code sets up a threepart test for determining whether a trade
or business carried on by a tax-exempt organization should be taxed. In its discussion, the Court found that the ABE's insurance program is regularly carried on,
that it is not substantially related to the
purpose of the ABE's tax-exempt status,
and that its activity is both "the sale of
goods" and "the performance of services."
Thus the three-part test is satisfied. Furthermore, the program possesses the characteristics of services provided by other
entities for a profit. After this initial conclusion, the Court went on to strike down
three of the four factors relied on by the
Claims Court in its holding.
As to the program's success in generating
dividends, the Court found this to be a
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